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Introduction and Context 
   
Operation ‘Market Garden’ was initiated by Allied forces on the 17th September 
1944, ending on the 25th of the same month. Up until that point of the Second World War, it 
was the largest airborne landing to have ever been undertaken.1 The main aim of Operation 
‘Market Garden’ was to open up an invasion route for the Allied forces into the north of 
Germany from the Netherlands. In order to do this, the operation sought to capture and 
cross a number of bridges over a series of rivers and canals, including the Rhine and the 
Maas.2 The first part of this operation - ‘Market’ - involved the landing of paratroopers in 
proximity to these bridges in order to capture and secure, awaiting part two of the 
operation. ‘Garden’ involved the movement of heavier units from Belgium, up through the 
Netherlands, relieving the units holding these bridges (See Source 0.01, 0.02, 0.03).3  
The operation ended in disaster following a number of hindrances and tactical error. This 
included an array of faults related to strategy, intelligence, planning, weather and fortune. It 
was General Bernard Montgomery, who devised the plan, and remained “Market Garden’s 
unrepentant advocate”, although the operation was deemed a failure.4  
Following the unsuccessful operation, the Allied forces were unable to cross the Rhine until 
1945 and aside from the delay, the failure led to a severe fall in British military morale.5 This 
drop was then exacerbated by the period of hard fighting encountered by units of the 
British 21st Army Group, the force under Montgomery’s command. One of which was British 
VIII Corps, who were set the task to clear the region from enemy forces up to the River 
Maas, in preparation for the invasion and ultimate demise of Nazi Germany.6 This thesis will 
                                                          
1 Charles B. Macdonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, (Centre of Military History, US Army; Washington, D.C., 
1993) p.132 
2 Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshall Montgomery, (Collins; London, 1958) p. 272 
3 L. F. Ellis, & A. E. Warhurst, Victory in the West. Vol. II: The Defeat of Germany, (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office; 
London, 1969) (History of the Second World War. United Kingdom Military Series. Ed: Sir James Butler) p.29 
4 Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshall Montgomery, p. 298 
5 Jonathan Fennell, ‘Reevaluating Combat Cohesion: The British Second Army in The Northwest Europe 
Campaign of the Second World War’ P.25 in King, Anthony (ed.), Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-
First Century (Oxford University Press, 2015) 
6 Charles Forrester, Monty’s Functional Doctrine: Combined Arms Doctrine in British 21st Army Group in North 
West Europe, 1944-45, (Helion & Company Ltd; UK, 2015) p.112 
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explore the deteriorative influences upon the morale of the British 21st Army Group in the 
shadow of Operation ‘Market Garden’. 
This work is heavily grounded in the events of late September 1944, this is predominantly 
because the failure of operation ‘Market Garden’, led to change in strategy and a new set of 
requirements for the Allies.7 Thus, the failure to secure the final bridge at Arnhem was 
pivotal to the substantial drop in morale amongst the British troops. This drop has been 
identified by Jonathan Fennell’s in his study into the states of morale within the British 21st 
Army Group.8 Fennell’s work will be act as foundation for this thesis, upon which this work 
shall endeavour to illuminate the core factors that deteriorated morale for many British 
troops in the latter stages of 1944. 
In terms of historiography, the heroic last stand at Arnhem has inspired much interest and 
debate into the topic. The operation gained a solid association with the phrase ‘A Bridge Too 
Far’ after the publishing of Cornelius Ryan’s book in 1974.9 Since Ryan’s book was adapted 
to film in 1977, 10  the operation has been in the domain of popular history of the Second 
World War, with a great deal of literature and films produced to give a version of history to 
a wider audience.11 This has had the effect of catalysing debate surrounding the causative 
factors leading to the failure of the attack. One key view of academic historiography, argued 
by John Buckley, suggests that the failure was a conceptual one.12 In other words, we can 
infer from this that the failure was due to poor; planning, organisation, leadership and 
strategy.  
                                                          
7 Charles Forrester, Monty’s Functional Doctrine: Combined Arms Doctrine in British 21st Army Group in North 
West Europe, 1944-45, (Helion & Company Ltd; UK, 2015) pp.111-116 
8 Jonathan Fennell, ‘Reevaluating Combat Cohesion: The British Second Army in The Northwest Europe 
Campaign of the Second World War’ P.25 
9 Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, (Popular Library; 1974) 
10 A Bridge Too Far (United Artists; UK, 1977)  
11 For examples of books –  
Major General J. Frost, A Drop Too Many (Pen & Sword Ltd.; UK, 2008) 
Major General R. E. Urquhart, Arnhem (Pen & Sword Ltd.; UK, 2011) 
Sebastian Ritchie, Arnhem Myth and Reality: Airborne Warfare, Air Power and the Failure of Operation Market 
Garden, (Robert Hale Ltd; London, 2011) 
Christopher Hibbert, Arnhem, (The Windrush Press; UK, 1998) 
Bob Carruthers (Ed.) ‘Arnhem 1944: A Bridge Too Far?’, (Pen & Sword Military; UK, 2013) 
12 John Buckley, Monty’s Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe, pp.208-231 
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After the United States joined the war effort in a more meaningful role in late 1941, strategy 
in the Second World War “was fashioned by powers with diverse national interests”.13 This 
becomes perceptibly clear in the strategic debate surrounding the means in which the Allied 
powers would advance into Germany.14 After the invasion of Normandy in June 1944, and 
the consequent break out of the region, strategy was debated between rival Generals within 
the Allied forces including US Generals George Patton, Omar Bradley and the now Supreme 
Commander of Allied Forces Dwight Eisenhower. In the view of British General Bernard 
Montgomery, a powerful thrust towards Berlin was the best means of ending the war as 
soon as possible.15 However, Eisenhower opted for a ‘Broad Front’ as a means of balancing 
rival demands from US and British Commanders.16 This is noted in Montgomery’s memoirs 
as he reflected upon the requirements of the British. Montgomery claimed;  
The British economy and man-power situation demanded victory in 1944: no later. 
Also, the war was bearing hardly on the mass of the people in Britain; it must be 
brought to a close quickly. Our “must” was different from the American must: a 
difference in urgency, as well as a difference in doctrine. This the American generals 
did not understand; the war had never been brought to their home country. Why 
should we throw everything away for reasons of American public opinion and 
American electioneering (1944 was the Presidential election year)? The strategy we 
were now to adopt would mean more casualties in killed and wounded. The armies 
were not being deployed on a broad front for any reasons of safety… Indeed, my 
plan offered the only possibility of bringing the war to a quick end.17 
Instead of going for this audacious though risk burdened plan, Eisenhower, as Ernest J. King 
Chair writes, went for a “dull, unimaginative, but thoroughly safe campaign”.18 The ‘Broad 
Front’, whilst self-explanatory, involved engaging the Germans across a wide front and 
                                                          
13 Maurice Matloff, ‘Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939- 1945’, in Peter Paret (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy: 
From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Oxford; New York, 1998) p.678 
14 Maurice Matloff, ‘Allied Strategy in Europe, 1939- 1945’, in Peter Paret (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy: 
From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, (Oxford; New York, 1998) p.678 
15 Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshall Montgomery, pp.270 -272 
16 Anthony Beevor, Arnhem: The Battle of the Bridges, 1944 (Penguin, UK, 2019) p.4 
17 Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshall Montgomery, pp.270 -272 
18 Ernest J. King Chair, ‘Applied Strategy of World War II’ Naval War College Review Vol. 22, No. 9 (May 1970), 
pp. 62-70 p.64 
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wearing them down.19 Anthony Beevor notes that even the Germans were relieved with the 
‘Broad Front’ strategy, as troops were distributed along a long line making both offensive 
and defensive operations more difficult.20.  
The ‘Single Thrust’ thus, entailed a “really powerful and full-blooded thrust towards Berlin”, 
with all possible resources given to that effort.21 This case for urgency, as Montgomery 
made clear, was not unfounded, as King Chair argues, aside from the Russians and Japanese, 
the United Kingdom was “the most thoroughly mobilised nation in world war II. She was 
using up irreplaceable natural and human resources at an alarming rate. If she were to 
recover from victory she had to have something to recover with”.22 
Hence, we see a clear divide in necessity of the two nations which is reflected in the 
demands required by the corresponding Generals. Montgomery and Britain required a quick 
and clean victory, to end the economic and human drain which warfare brings so close to 
home. The US on the other hand, had no real restraints economically to necessitate riskier 
strategy to end the war quicker.23 Along with this Anthony Beevor points out that, this plan 
satisfied neither US nor British Generals, with US Generals Omar N. Bradley and George C. 
Patton desiring “to go through the Siegfried Line like shit through a goose”, and 
Montgomery’s plan to bypass German defences, both receiving insufficient backing to be 
successful.24 Eventually, an adapted version of Montgomery’s plan was adopted in the form 
of Operation ‘Market Garden’, though the operation was not given maximum priority by 
Eisenhower, and was to be adopted within his ‘Broad Front’ strategy.25 
One reason to launch the operation was due to information about the strength of the 
Wehrmacht. This will be discussed at length in chapter two of this thesis, however, a 
founding element to the view of German weakness was because thousands of German 
prisoners were being taken daily. Fennell points out in Le Havre 11,000 prisoners were taken 
                                                          
19 Ernest J. King Chair, ‘Applied Strategy of World War II’ Naval War College Review Vol. 22, No. 9 (May 1970), 
pp. 62-70 p.62-66 
20 Anthony Beevor, Arnhem: The Battle of the Bridges, 1944, p.4 
21 Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshall Montgomery, p. 272 
22 Ernest J. King Chair, ‘Applied Strategy of World War II’ p.64 
23 Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshall Montgomery, pp.270 -272 
Ernest J. King Chair, ‘Applied Strategy of World War II’ p.64 
24 Anthony Beevor, Arnhem: The Battle of the Bridges, 1944 p.4 
25 Christopher Hibbert, Arnhem, (Phoenix; London, 2003) pp. 30–31. 
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at the cost of 388 casualties.26 Thus, given the perceived state of the Wehrmacht, with a 
high proportion of divisions unfit for service, and a view amongst the Allies of imminent 
collapse.27 “Monty’s insatiable appetite”,28 finally swayed the opinion of Dwight 
Eisenhower, leading to acceptance of Montgomery’s plan for the decisive defeat of 
Germany.29  
The historiography around whether Montgomery’s suggestion of a full-blooded thrust 
would have been successful is split. Historians such as R W Thompson in his critical study of 
Bernard Montgomery and H. Essame, agree with the view that victory could have been 
achieved in 1944.30 On the contrary, the official history of the Second World War by L. F. 
Ellis and A. E. Warhurst are generally more supportive of Dwight Eisenhower’s broader 
front.31 The discussion surrounding the adopted strategy, although hypothetical at times, is 
important to note as it is relevant later in the investigation of the impact the failure of 
Operation ‘Market Garden’ had upon morale. This is because the attempt to break through 
and cross the Rhine at Arnhem was fundamentally the work of Montgomery, although 
lacking the full requirements to make it ‘full-blooded’ enough, it determined the state of 
British morale in the later stages of 1944. 
This shift in strategy from Eisenhower is an overarching issue when assessing morale, as to 
state hypothetically, had the Supreme Commander not allowed this move, or had he given 
Montgomery’s plan the sufficient supplies, the subsequent dip in morale may have been 
different. Failure in strategy however, cannot be placed solely upon Eisenhower, as it was 
Montgomery who led the planning for Operation Market Garden with Lieutenant General 
                                                          
26 Jonathan Fennell, Fighting the People’s War: The British and Commonwealth Armies in the Second World War, 
p.555 
27 Stewart W. Bentley Jr., ‘Operation MARKET-GARDEN: Historical Perspective for Future Combined Arms Deep 
Battle’, Army History, No. 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 12-20 p.12 
28 B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (Book Club Associates: UK, 1979) p.565 
29 Jonathan Fennell, Fighting the People’s War: The British and Commonwealth Armies in the Second World War, 
pp.555-6 
30 R. W. Thompson, Montgomery the Field Marshal: A Critical Study of the Generalship of Field- Marshal, The 
Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K. G., and of the campaign in North-West Europe, 1944-45. (Allen & Unwin; 
London, 1969 
H. Essame, The Battle for Germany, (Batsford; London, 1969) 
31 L. F. Ellis & A. E. Warhurst, Victory in the West. Vol. II: The Defeat of Germany, (History of the Second World 
War. United Kingdom Military Series. Ed: Sir James Butler) (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office; London, 1969)  
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Frederick Browning.32 Thus, the relevance of good strategy and leadership is prevalent in 
the maintenance of strong morale in future operations. 
To explain the shortcomings of strategy and leadership, key factors to the failure of the 
operation are identified by secondary writings. A prominent factor is in regard to landing 
zones of airborne troops. This alone, William F. Buckingham argues, was “the single most 
important factor in the failure at Arnhem”.33 The drop zones of the airborne troops was 
between six and eight miles to the west of the bridge at Arnhem.34 Drops also took place 
over a period of three days to the same drop zone locations, which undermined the element 
of surprise and enabled German forces to focus counter attacks to a particular location.35 
Consequently, a trend within the historiography is becoming apparent, one which views the 
repulsion a failure of strategy and planning  
A prevalent element within much of the historiography of Market Garden’s failure, comes in 
the from the supposed overlooking of ULTRA intelligence reports. These told of German II SS 
Panzer Corp Divisions and reinforcements in the Arnhem area.36 However, as Sebastian 
Ritchie argues, much of this intelligence argument is based upon legend rather than 
evidence.37 In fact for Ritchie “the key Allied failure did not relate to II SS Panzer Corps at all. 
Rather, it concerned the Germans’ ability to deploy as infantry at very short notice an 
extraordinary array of auxiliary personnel”.38 That being said, Stewart Bentley asserts that 
Montgomery and Browning’s failure to take full advantage of intelligence reports was some 
of their “most important mistakes”.39 Reportedly, issues such as bad weather also played a 
role in the operations failure, with reinforcing forces prevented because of this.40 
                                                          
32 L. F. Ellis & A. E. Warhurst, Victory in the West. Vol. II: The Defeat of Germany p.29 
33 William F. Buckingham, Arnhem 1944, (Tempus; UK, 2004) p.231 
34 Stewart W. Bentley Jr., ‘Operation MARKET-GARDEN: Historical Perspective for Future Combined Arms Deep 
Battle’, Army History, No. 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 12-20 p.14  
35 Christopher Hibbert, Arnhem, p.184 
36 Stewart W. Bentley Jr., ‘Operation MARKET-GARDEN: Historical Perspective for Future Combined Arms Deep 
Battle’, Army History, No. 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 12-20 p.17 
37 Sebastian Ritchie, Arnhem Myth and Reality: Airborne Warfare, Air Power and the Failure of Operation Market 
Garden, (Robert Hale Ltd; London, 2011) p. 125 
38 Sebastian Ritchie, Arnhem Myth and Reality: Airborne Warfare, Air Power and the Failure of Operation Market 
Garden, pp.126-7 
39 Stewart W. Bentley Jr., ‘Operation MARKET-GARDEN: Historical Perspective for Future Combined Arms Deep 
Battle’ p.17  
40 Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint, John Pritchard, Total War: The Causes and Course of the Second World War, (2nd 
Ed) (Viking; UK, 1989) p.548 
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When addressing the subject of secondary literature, there is an abundance surrounding a 
variety of debates relevant to Operation ‘Market Garden’. However, in regards to the period 
following the failure of the operation, there is surprisingly a great deal less. Charles 
Forrester gives a possible explanation to this relative lack of public interest, noting the 
contrast to ‘Market Garden’. He states that British VIII Corps would “play an important but 
subsidiary role”.41 Indeed, the role of VIII Corps during the later stages of 1944, would prove 
“useful though unspectacular”.42  
Though, it is the work of Dutch historians A. Korthals Altes & N. K. C. A. In’t Veld, in their 
aptly named book - The Forgotten Battle: Overloon and the Maas Salient 1944-45 - who 
attempt to illustrate the events in the region. With this in mind the book, published in 1995, 
acknowledges the lack of secondary material on topic, stating in the introduction, that “no 
more detailed description… than given in this book has yet been published”.43 In the twenty-
four years following the publishing of this book, there are no publications of any other 
additional research of the topic and in particular, the parameters set by this thesis.  
Jonathan Fennell’s work, whilst focusing heavily on the study of morale, also does not 
examine this particular period of fighting in any real depth.44 Generally, information of these 
battles appears sporadically within the history of particular divisions, such as that of 6th 
Guards Tank Brigade.45 However, works such as these often lack a solid academic grounding 
and present themselves in the form of a general narrative.46 
With reference to existing oral testimony, the importance and relevance of morale is clear 
through the study of combatants involved in this period of fighting. Morale whilst 
subjective, holds great significance when considering both victory and defeat. It is clear that 
                                                          
41 Charles Forrester, Monty’s Functional Doctrine. p.112 
42 Charles Forrester, Monty’s Functional Doctrine. p.112 
43 A. Korthals Altes & N. K. C. A. In’t Veld, The Forgotten Battle: Overloon and the Maas Salient 1944-45, 
(Spellmount Ltd. ; UK, 1995) p.ix 
44 Jonathan Fennell, Fighting the People’s War: The British and Commonwealth Armies in the Second World War, 
(Cambridge University Press; UK, 2019) 
45 Patrick Forbes, 6th Guards Tank Brigade the Story of Guardsmen in Churchill Tanks, (Naval & Military Press; 
UK, 2015)  
46 Patrick Forbes, 6th Guards Tank Brigade the Story of Guardsmen in Churchill Tanks, (Naval & Military Press; 
UK, 2015) 
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throughout the history of warfare, maintaining high levels of morale is a central pillar of 
cohesive and impassioned combat.47  
With consideration to the shadow of defeat following operation ‘Market Garden’ and the 
requirements of the 21st Army Group. It is evident from much of the available literature, 
that levels of morale during this period dropped notably.48 Hence, there is a need within this 
thesis, to explore what factors detriment morale in a military environment.  
One identifiable erosive factor in this specific period, is the weather conditions and terrain 
of the region of combat. Poor weather conditions, in particular heavy rain, played an 
evidential role in not only reducing willingness to fight amongst the troops, but making the 
terrain more difficult to manoeuvre. This in turn, made fighting in the battle of Overloon 
and Venraij (Venray) much more treacherous and complex.  
Another factor, contributory to the former, is the revival of German resistance following the 
failure of ‘Market Garden’.49 The unexpected resistance of the Wehrmacht made fighting 
much more difficult for the British 21st Army Group – thus, causing additional and 
detrimental effects upon morale.  
This study will be a fundamental part in the understanding of the influencing and 
contributing factors upon British troop morale in the period between ‘Market Garden’ and 
the Ardennes Offensive and its impact upon the fighting ability of the 21st Army Group. It is 
a period which has somewhat been overlooked by many historians, and there has not been 
a study of the same parameters published before. With these factors considered, this 
dissertation will be undertaken to provide a qualitative examination of the topic, in order to 
compliment the quantitative studies of morale undertaken by Jonathan Fennell.50  
Therefore, the first chapter of this thesis will show how the weather conditions and the 
terrain of the environment around Overloon and Venraij, had a detrimental effect upon 
                                                          
47 Godfrey Hutchinson, Xenophon and the Art of Command, (London; Greenhill Books, 2000) p.60 
48 Jonathan Fennell, ‘Reevaluating Combat Cohesion: The British Second Army in The Northwest Europe 
Campaign of the Second World War’ p.25 in Anthony King (ed.), Frontline: Combat and Cohesion in the Twenty-
First Century (Oxford University Press, 2015) 
49 Gerhard L. Weinberg, The World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, (Cambridge University Press; New 
York, 2005) pp.701-702 
50 Jonathan Fennell, ‘In Search of the X Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 
Vol. 37: 6-7, pp. 799-828. 
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fighting capabilities of the British. Resulting in the deterioration of morale amongst the 21st 
Army Group. Chapter two, will examine the reasoning behind the decision to launch 
operation ‘Market Garden’ by gauging the presumption held by the Allies of the 
Wehrmacht’s strength following retreat from France. This will be followed an examination 
into the effect of this resurrection of German fighting ability, upon the morale of the 21st 
Army Group. 
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Source 0.0151 
Operation Market Garden Route Plan 
The image below shows a rough guide curated by the author of the route taken by the Allied 
ground forces in ‘Garden’ depicted as red arrows - arrow breaks indicate bridges to be 
crossed) 
 
 
 
                                                          
51 Map taken from Google Maps. Arrows added by Harry Kirby- Jones 
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Source 0.0252 
“‘Sketch Showing Detail of Routes to Arnhem’ From Operation Market Garden Official 
Report” 
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Source 0.0353 
“‘Plan of Route’ From Operation Market Garden Official Report 
                                                          
52 ‘Sketch Showing Detail of Routes to Arnhem’ From Operation Market Garden Official Report, The National 
Archives – WO 205/1126 
53 ‘Plan of Route’ From Operation Market Garden Official Report, The National Archives - AIR/1249 
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Defining Military Morale 
 
The morale of troops is a phrase often defined as the mental, emotional state of 
individuals without much regard to the complexity of psychology.54 To define this concept is 
not without great difficulty as James A. Ulio eloquently states, “it is like life itself, in that the 
moment you undertake to define it you begin to limit its meaning within the restrictive 
boundaries of mere language”.55 For Ulio, the closest definition of the term is “that 
conditioned quality, in the individual soldier and in the unit of command, which holds the 
soldier, holds the unit, to the performance of duty despite every opposing force or 
influence”.56  
The subjectivity of the word is clear within Ulio’s definition, it can be anything that holds 
firm the fighting ability and endeavour of the individual, the group, or both. Thus, it is easy 
to understand why an array of academics from varying fields have attempted to address this 
definition in previous studies, with considerations to the importance of maintaining high 
states of morale in respect to fighting capabilities.  
Jonathan Fennell, a dominant figure in assessment of military morale, asserts that whilst a 
great number of definitions of the term are focused around the concepts of “affective 
states, such as contentment and happiness, and group dynamics”, there are crucial flaws of 
an emphasis of these mental states.57 Namely, Fennell uses the example of the Vietnam War 
in which, high morale within a small group of soldiers, may in turn lead to mutiny as a 
necessity for group survival, thus undermining the needs of the military under which they 
served.58  
Fennell concludes that it is “important to stress that motivation does not require the 
individual or group to be positive about assigned objectives. Combatants can be highly 
motivated to carry out tasks that they don’t necessarily want to engage with, that they are 
not hopeful, optimistic or confident will succeed”, though contentment is a contributory 
                                                          
54 ‘Morale’ Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/morale) 
55 James A. Ulio, ‘Military Morale’ American Journal of Sociology Vol. 47, No. 3 (Nov., 1941), pp. 321-330 p.321 
56 James A. Ulio, ‘Military Morale’ American Journal of Sociology. p.321 
57 Jonathan Fennell, ‘Reevaluating Combat Cohesion: The British Second Army in The Northwest Europe 
Campaign of the Second World War’ Pp.7-8 
58 Jonathan Fennell, ‘Reevaluating Combat Cohesion: The British Second Army in The Northwest Europe 
Campaign of the Second World War’ Pp.7-8 
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factor to the maintenance of morale.59 Fennell looks to Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery, 
a key character featured in this dissertation, who stated that morale was the “the quality 
which makes men go forward in an attack and hold their ground in defence”.60  
The importance of military morale is well noted throughout history. Sean Childs highlights 
the view of Xenophon - a soldier of the fourth century - who claims that “in action, the 
sustaining of morale was an imperative”.61 In his definition of the term morale, Childs takes 
an approach similar to that of Fennell, recognising the challenging relationship with 
affective states and favouring a style which sees military morale as being closely tied to 
troop motivation.62 
Having considered these definitions, it is difficult to disagree with Fennell’s explanation of 
morale in a military context. It is true that for an individual to go into an environment in 
which their life may be lost, if not seriously injured - be it psychologically or physically, they 
may not be too keen about such an endeavour. Consequently, the association of happiness 
to the desire to kill or be killed appears to be an almost inhumane trait, and thus is, as S. L. 
A. Marshall claimed, the “basic philosophy governing human relationships within an 
army”.63 Therefore, the vertebrate of morale must originate form motivating influences 
upon the individual soldier and the group of soldiers.  
In terms of impacting influences upon military morale, there exist two main categories that 
are used by sociologists, psychologists and historians alike, these are endogenous and 
exogenous factors. The former is used to describe elements inside the military force and the 
latter refers to external influences. Jonathan Fennell proposed the following framework to 
identify possible key external and internal stimuli for military morale.64  
                                                          
59 Jonathan Fennell, ‘Reevaluating Combat Cohesion: The British Second Army in The Northwest Europe 
Campaign of the Second World War’ p.8 
60 Imperial War Museum (IWM) 99/1/2 Major General Raymond Briggs Papers, Paper by Field-Marshal 
Montgomery, ‘Morale in Battle: Analysis’, 30 April 1946, p.43. 
61 Godfrey Hutchinson, Xenophon and the Art of Command, (London; Greenhill Books, 2000) p.60 cited in Sean 
Childs, ‘Soldier Morale: Defending a Core Military Capability’ Security Challenges Vol. 12, No. 2 (2016), pp. 43-52 
pp. 43-44 
62 Sean Childs, ‘Soldier Morale: Defending a Core Military Capability’ Security Challenges Vol. 12, No. 2 (2016), 
pp. 43-52 pp. 45-46 
63 S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War, (Alexandria: Byrdd 
Enterprises, Inc., 1947) p. 165 
64 Jonathan Fennell, ‘In Search of the X Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy’ pp.11-12 
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Source 0.04 
“Factors affecting the morale of troops, commanders and the army.”65 
 
Upon this recreated table, it is evident that identified variables affecting morale are 
numerous. They vary from structural factors such as political ideology to leadership, to more 
micro level factors such as past experiences and training of individual soldiers. This study 
will use this framework to inform the selection of relevant concepts that may illuminate the 
consequence of  the failure of ‘Market Garden’. In particular, this will address the 
experiences of the 21st Army Group after in subsequential months following the doomed 
operation. This in turn will provide an insight to the exogenous and endogenous factors 
influencing morale amongst the British forces active in this region.  
                                                          
65 Jonathan Fennell, ‘In Search of the X Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy’ pp.11-12 
Endogenous Factors Influencing Morale 
Institutional 
Command   Discipline   Selection   Welfare/Educ.   Ethics/Duty   Training   Organisation   
Supply 
Social 
Leadership   Cohesion   Espirit 
Individual 
Disposition   Background   Coping Strategies   Relationship with Home   Fear/Confidence   
Fatigue/Rest 
 
Exogenous Factors Influencing Morale 
Political 
Propaganda   Aims   Ideology   Force Size 
Economic 
Technology   Output 
Cultural 
Law   Values/Ethics   View of Enemy 
Environmental 
Terrain   Climate 
Situational 
Information   Rumour   Friction   Antecedents 
 
Morale 
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To fully express the complexity of the study of military morale, another framework is 
identified by Tarak Barkawi, who suggests that factors influencing morale should  be divided 
into the ‘Societal’, which “locates soldiers and armies within the culture and society from 
which they were recruited... ideologies derived from this context shape the way the soldiers 
behave and give them a ‘cause’ for which to fight”.66 The other method is ‘Organizational’, 
which is similar to ‘Endogenous’ factors, in the way that it focuses upon the the internal 
workings of the military force, such as “professionalism, regimental tradition… unit identity, 
quality of leadership… full stomachs, good weapons, training”.67 Barkawi’s classification 
mirrors the work of Fennell, using only different terminology to equate the same meaning.  
 
Morale, Leadership and Strategy in the Second World War 
 
The importance of good leadership cannot be understated in the maintenance of 
positive morale within fighting forces. Leaders such as Julius Caesar, Hannibal and Oliver 
Cromwell, to name just a few have relied upon understanding morale of their armies in 
order to effectively use it to in many cases to overcome great odds in battle.68 Leadership 
and strategy is relevant to this study, as it was indeed the strategy and leadership of 
individuals such as Montgomery who devised the plan for ‘Market Garden’ and inspired 
troops to fight. Thus, it is a main causative factor behind fluctuations in military morale.  
Another example relevant to the Second World War was Adolf Hitler’s construction of an 
infatuated populous and military machine. Arthur Upham Pope claims that the need to 
control morale was long known to Germany after the First World War. Pope suggests that it 
was the belief in the “early twenties… that morale and propaganda forces would decide the 
next war.69  
The Third Reich, thus produced a fanaticised armed force, evident not just within the SS. 
More recently, the complicity of the Wehrmacht in the National Socialist regime and its 
                                                          
66 Tarak Barkawi, ‘Culture and Combat in the Colonies: The Indian Army in the Second World War’, Journal of 
Contemporary History, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Apr., 2006), pp. 325-355 p.325 
67 Tarak Barkawi, ‘Culture and Combat in the Colonies: The Indian Army in the Second World War’ p.326 
68 Arthur Upham Pope, ‘The Importance of Morale’ The Journal of Educational Sociology, Vol. 15, No. 4, Civilian 
Morale (Dec., 1941), pp. 195-205 p.195 
69 Arthur Upham Pope, ‘The Importance of Morale’ p.197 
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ideology was made evident in 1995 by the exhibition, War of Annihilation: Crimes of the 
Wehrmacht 1941-1945, which documented the ‘average’ German soldiers’ active 
involvement in war crimes. In Thomas Kuhne’s study of comradeship within the Wehrmacht, 
it becomes evident that the binding forces of morale within the German military were 
bound for a number of diverse factors, ranging from leadership, ideology to perceived 
brotherhood.70   
In regards to warfare strategy is as important, if not more, than leadership in terms of the 
maintenance of morale. Prussian military scholar Carl von Clausewitz defined strategy as 
“the use of engagements for the object of war”.71 Strategy for Clausewitz was a means of 
obtaining policy goals through use of armed forces, which is different to tactics which can be 
defined as the use of arms during an engagement.72 Colin Gray describes strategy as “the 
use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy”.73 In other words, 
strategy is the means of achieving what is desired by the military force or nation, be it 
unconditional surrender or the capture of a city.  
Peter Paret takes a similar stance, asserting that “strategy is the use of an armed force to 
achieve the military objectives and, by extension, the political purpose of the war”.74 
Strategy therefore, underpins how an armed force will act and what they should do in order 
to reach the desired goals. As well as this, and pertinent to this thesis, strategy also 
determines success, failure and what will be encountered by soldiers.   
In the context of the Second World War, a relevant example of the application of good 
leadership and strategy upon forces is at the Second Battle of El Alamein in October to 
November 1942. This battle demonstrates the importance of the stimuli influential upon 
morale. At Alamein the British Eighth Army - under the command of Montgomery - turned 
the tide against Field Marshal Erwin Rommel to begin to push the Axis forces out of North 
Africa. As Fennell notes, in North Africa prior to Montgomery’s take over, “the defeats 
suffered by Eighth Army at Gazala and Tobruk, in May and June 1942, and the stalemate on 
                                                          
70 Thomas Kuhne, The Rise and Fall of Comradeship: Hitler’s Soldiers, Male Bonding and Mass Violence in the 
Twentieth Century, (Cambridge University Press; UK, 2017) pp.1-6 
71 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard & Peter Paret, (Princeton; NJ, 1976) p.128 
72 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, (Oxford University Press; UK 2012) P.17 
73 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy, P.17 
74 Peter Paret ‘Introduction’ in Peter Paret (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy: Form Machiavelli to the Nuclear 
Age, (Oxford; New York, 1998) p.3 
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the El Alamein line, in July 1942, were, it can be argued, influenced significantly by a morale 
crisis that reached a peak in the first two weeks of August 1942”.75 Fennell continues, 
“deficiencies in for example leadership, training and equipment had an extremely negative 
impact on the material means available to Eighth Army, but they also impacted seriously on 
morale”.76 It can be inferred that failures in strategy and leadership can cause a spiral of 
declining morale, fuelled by further military disappointments.  
Therefore, the consequence of diminishing morale within the Eighth Army had the effect of 
further inhibiting grand strategy of the conflict in North Africa.77 This resulted in the 
replacement of Commander in Chief Middle East, Claude Auchinleck for Harold Alexander, 
and put in charge of the Eight Army was Montgomery, whom under the circumstances, 
presented determined efforts to, “improve the endogenous and exogenous factors 
influencing morale in the desert: Montgomery built his command style around the need to 
foster the will to fight in his men”.78  
Along with this, Montgomery set targets that were realistic given the settings the Eighth 
Army were faced with.79 The adoption of a more positive strategic manner also had effects 
on the morale of the enemy, as factors such as increasing equipment such as tanks, and the 
reevaluation of the use of artillery helped to weaken the German will to fight and influence 
their strategy in the theatre.80  
Evidence therefore suggests that adequate leadership and strategy is vital to the fostering of 
good morale within an armed force. The consequence of Montgomery’s actions contributed 
to a resounding victory over the Panzerarmee Afrika after some considerable defeats in the 
theatre.81 Following this victory, Montgomery was appointed commander of Allied Ground 
forces during the invasion of Normandy and in charge of the British 21st Army Group in the 
period relevant to this dissertation.  
                                                          
75 Jonathan Fennell, ‘In Search of the X Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy’ p.21  
76 Jonathan Fennell, ‘In Search of the X Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy’ pp.21-22  
77 Jonathan Fennell, ‘In Search of the X Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy’ p.22 
78 Jonathan Fennell, ‘In Search of the X Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy’ p.22 
79 Jonathan Fennell, ‘In Search of the X Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy’ p.22-23 
80 Jonathan Fennell, ‘In Search of the X Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy’ pp.25-28 
81 Jonathan Fennell, ‘In Search of the X Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy’ p.22-23 
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However, Montgomery’s strategy and leadership throughout the war is not without its 
critics, as he was often seen as a difficult man to deal with, as was the view of both Winston 
Churchill and US General Dwight Eisenhower.82 Cornelius Ryan noted the ferocity of 
Montgomery when in conversation with the US General which led to the response, “Steady, 
Monty! You can't talk to me like that. I'm your boss”.83 Monty’s fierce determination 
nonetheless, would prove decisive in the adoption of the plan for ‘Market Garden’. 
Strategy and leadership, as Fennell has made clear, are tightly bound to the study of troop 
morale, for obvious reasons. That being if there is limited confidence in those leading that 
they will be successful, then confidence and the will to fight will diminish. In the strategic 
clash between Eisenhower and Montgomery in 1944, failure in strategy and leadership had 
a negative impact in troop morale, which was further catalysed by the battles and 
conditions faced as a result. The consequence for morale of the failure at Arnhem has been 
quantified in Jonathan Fennell’s work, as documented in the graph below.84 
 
                                                          
82 John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy, (Penguin, 1994) P.56 
83 Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far, (Popular Library; 1974) P. 85-88 
84 Jonathan Fennell, ‘Reevaluating Combat Cohesion: The British Second Army in The Northwest Europe 
Campaign of the Second World War’ P.25 
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Source 0.0585 
“Second Army, Weekly Admissions per 1,000 to General Hospitals and Casualty Clearing 
Stations for Sickness, Battle Exhaustion and SIW, 11 June 1944 to 5 May 1945. Morale scale 
equivalents are presented on the right-hand Y-axis” 
 
Fennell’s study, identified factors such as battle exhaustion, desertion and self-inflicted 
wounds, and placed them in conjunction with bi-weekly ‘Censorship Summaries’ compiled 
from examined letters made by members of the British Second Army, which includes the 
21st Army Group.86  
The classifications of morale on the right-hand side of the Y-axis were determined by the 
studying of these ‘Censorship Summaries’, after which Fennell was able to categorise 
assumed states of morale ranging ‘Excellent’ to ‘Very Low’.87 On the timeline he has used 
the combined scores from both studies, quantitative and qualitative, in order to document 
troughs and peaks of British troop morale in a more generalised and quantifiable manner.  
                                                          
85 Jonathan Fennell, ‘Reevaluating Combat Cohesion: The British Second Army in The Northwest Europe 
Campaign of the Second World War’ P.25 
86 Jonathan Fennell, ‘Reevaluating Combat Cohesion: The British Second Army in The Northwest Europe 
Campaign of the Second World War’ Pp.16-27 
87 Jonathan Fennell, ‘Reevaluating Combat Cohesion: The British Second Army in The Northwest Europe 
Campaign of the Second World War’ Pp.16-27 
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As is evident from this graph, although it is not the largest fall, the following months after 
Operation ‘Market Garden’ sees a noticeable decline in morale, from a peak following the 
devastating German defeat in the battle of the Falaise Pocket a few months prior.88 Fennell 
explains this decline, “for example, morale would appear to have been at its highest before 
and during Operation Market Garden. But Market Garden was failure. It is likely, as John 
Buckley has argued, that Market Garden was a conceptual failure rather than a morale 
one”.89 This provides a good explanation for the importance of competent leadership and 
strategy, as although morale was bolstered to a point deemed ‘Excellent’ in Fennell’s study, 
failure still prevailed. Hence, strategy is a crucial element to the maintenance and creation 
of positive morale.  
The bulk of this dissertation will be focused on the dip following ‘Market Garden’, in late 
September 1944 proceeding into the battles for Overloon and Venraij. As noticeable on 
Fennell’s timeline (Source 0.05), there is a gradual decline in morale, with slight increases 
throughout this period. This time involved a period of hard fighting to clear the salient west 
of the Maas, made worse by bad weather, conditions and resistance from the enemy. 
Therefore, it is important to explore the context of the battles ensuing in the shadow cast by 
Operation ‘Market Garden’. 
 
The Shadow of Operation Market Garden 
 
Operation ‘Market Garden’, in summary was a failure for multiple reasons, 
underestimation of the enemy lead to an adoption of an over confident strategy, aimed at 
destroying the German Reich in one thrust. In the wake of the failure, Charles Forrester 
professes that “Montgomery realised that to make the final assault on Germany – that is, 
for the crossing of the Rhine to be successful – it would first be necessary to destroy the 
German forces between the Maas and the Rhine”.90  
                                                          
88 A Williams, D-Day to Berlin, (Hodder & Stoughton; London, 2004) Pp.204-206 
89 John Buckley, Monty’s Men: The British Army and the Liberation of Europe, (London: Yale University Press, 
2013) pp.208-31 
90 Charles Forrester, Monty’s Functional Doctrine: Combined Arms Doctrine in British 21st Army Group in North 
West Europe, 1944-45, p.111 
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Montgomery proposed that the Ruhr region of must be the “strategic objective” and that 
future operations required to “force mobile war on the Germans”.91 This task was given to 
British VIII Corps of the 21st Army Group under Lieutenant- General Sir R. N. O’Connor in 
Operation ‘Constellation’.92 The operation was made up of the 3rd British Infantry Division 
with supporting division of armoured units, such as the 6th Guard Tanks Brigade and the 11th 
Armoured Division.93 The intent of the operation was to take control of the towns of 
Overloon in Venraij (Venray) in an attempt to clear German forces from the west of the river 
Maas, subsequently blocking a German bridgehead at Venlo.94 (See source 0.06) 
                                                          
91 Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field-Marshall Montgomery, p.302 
92 Charles Forrester, Monty’s Functional Doctrine: Combined Arms Doctrine in British 21st Army Group in North 
West Europe, 1944-45, pp.111-5 
93 Charles Forrester, Monty’s Functional Doctrine: Combined Arms Doctrine in British 21st Army Group in North 
West Europe, 1944-45, pp.114-5 
94 Charles Forrester, Monty’s Functional Doctrine: Combined Arms Doctrine in British 21st Army Group in North 
West Europe, 1944-45, pp.114-5 
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Source 0.0695 
Map of region west of Maas with proposed route of Operation Constellation 
 
This work intends to illuminate this gap in the literature by investigating testimony from 
individuals who fought in the area, to better understand the endogenous and exogenous 
factors that were encountered and consequently affected morale. Examination will also look 
                                                          
95 ‘Map of region west of Maas with proposed route of Operation Constellation’ Map from Google Maps. Added 
to by Harry Kirby - Jones 
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to the resurgence of German fighting potential which had been overlooked by planning and 
strategy.   
Fennell’s work whilst extensive in the discovery of a quantifiable form of morale, fails to 
attach a qualitative study of the period discussed into his thesis. Through studying oral 
testimony given by combatants there are main themes that present themselves, these could 
be potential reasons for increased rates of sickness, battle exhaustion, desertion and self-
inflicted wounds.  
Along with this, coverage of the impact of weather conditions and terrain - and the 
connection between the two exogenous factors - is not given sufficient attention when 
discussing the 21st Army Group’s campaign after ‘Market Garden’. A study of personal 
experiences of the battle, given through interviews, are of great use in identifying emotional 
response when discussing feature of the battle. The intent of this thesis is to use Jonathan 
Fennell’s framework in attempting to quantify states of military morale through 1944 and 
1945 (Source 0.05), as a basis for further study in the other qualitative aspect of the topic.  
In chapter one, the impact of conditions and terrain will be explored and considered 
alongside established knowledge on this period of fighting. The key themes identified in the 
following chapters will suggest worthy concepts in the future understanding of morale 
during the Second World War. As discussed in this chapter, this area of the Second World 
War has been overlooked by many historians, however, this thesis aims to fill the gaps in 
understanding of this period of fighting, and to illuminate the erosive impact upon morale. 
 
Methodology 
 
To complete this research, testimonial evidence of fifteen combatants was studied 
from the online source of the Imperial War Museum (IWM). This evidence however, does 
encounter issues when regarding reliability. This is primarily due to the period of time in 
which the events happened and when the interviews were recorded. In this instance, the 
majority of interviews were held between the late 1980s and 2000s. In which case, many 
interviewees are regarding events from over fifty years ago, which may result in 
discrepancies with reality. In terms of the study of morale, this does not present itself as too 
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great an issue, as one key element that will be explored will regard the emotional responses 
to this period. In other terms, how the interviewee felt about the situation and the manner 
in which they speak about the events. This will be a guiding tool towards discovering the 
period of fighting’s impact upon morale.  
In addition to this, the sample size available at the Imperial War Museum does also present 
difficulty in provided a generalised view of the deteriorative factors upon morale of an 
entire army. Whilst a number of differing regiments are examined, not every unit had the 
same experience and thus, a fully generalised thesis will be impossible. However, this work 
does aim to illuminate some common themes within the sources available. 
The National Archives also provided a bulk of this research, in particular documents and 
reports from institutions such as the War Office (WO). Documentation used in this thesis, 
provides a broad understanding of many elements of morale from a structural perspective. 
Given this, these sources can also prove reliable in the discovery of the interpretation of the 
military forces on a macro scale, and thus can guide the historian in the assumption made 
by institutions such as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).  
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Chapter 1 – Conditions, Terrain and Morale 
 
Weather conditions are a well know halter of armies, as Napoleon Bonaparte 
experienced in his invasion of Russia in 1812, poor conditions and terrain can devastate a 
military force.96 This chapter will examine the impact conditions, in terms of both weather 
and terrain, had upon the morale of the British 21st Army Group during the period following 
‘Market Garden’ - culminating in the battle of Overloon and the subsequent battles around 
Venraij. It will argue that weather conditions, when combined with the terrain of Maas 
salient made the conflict harder for the British both physically and psychologically, each of 
which were erosive to their morale. An explanation will also be given to how Fennell’s 
framework has grounded this chapter in terms of assessing levels of morale.  
To serve as evidence of this morale crisis, a qualitative study will be made of personal 
testimony to gauge states of morale amongst combatants, in order to further the 
quantitative study of morale referred to in source 0.05. As is clear in source 0.04 - climate, 
weather and terrain are exogenous factors, in other words, they are impacting factors 
outside of the military organisation.97 During the autumn and winter of 1944, the 
Netherlands experienced prolonged periods of rain and colder weather, as is customary to 
the time of year. In addition to this, the topography of this particular region of Europe 
would prove to be of no aid to the British during this period.  
Poor weather and terrain is evident from reports in The Times newspaper, which 
documented on 6th October 1944 that Allied forces in the area surrounding Overloon were, 
“moving ahead slowly, hindered by marshy terrain and enemy lines”.98 For armoured 
formations, The Times notes that it was much of the same, stating that the formation 
“fighting its south-eastward beyond Overloon is still more or less bogged down by the 
hopeless tank country”.99  
On the 16th October a similar situation was portrayed, asserting that the British advance had 
moved “1,000 yards to-day in the face of stern opposition and extremely troublesome 
                                                          
96 David C. Gompert, Hans Binnendijk, Bonny Lin ‘Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia, 1812’, Chapter in Blinders, 
Blunders, and Wars: What America and China Can Learn (Rand Corp.; 2014) pp.46-48  
97 Jonathan Fennell, ‘In Search of the “X” Factor: Morale and the Study of Strategy’, pp.9-12 
98 ‘Progress Beyond Antwerp’ The Times (London, England), Friday, October 6, 1944, Issue 49970, p.3. 
99 ‘Good Advance Beyond Turnhout’ The Times (London, England) Friday, October 6, 1944, Issue 49970, p.4. 
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conditions”.100 Consequently, it is clear that the terrain of the region wreaked havoc upon 
the manoeuvrability of the British attacking columns. Therefore, it is easy to see how this 
exogenous factor was influential upon the success of the foreseeable operations.   
Kaushik Roy makes the importance of these conditions clearer in terms of their effect upon 
the individual soldier. He argues that service conditions have a greater role in shaping 
morale than grand ideologies such as Fascism.101 Accordingly, what becomes apparent is 
that deteriorative influences upon morale can originate from a variety of arguably mundane 
sources, however, they can be highly destructive towards the maintenance of positive 
morale. 
 In the case of terrain, every military force and the campaigns that are undertaken are 
constricted by the surface area of the country in which they are fighting.102 Under these 
circumstances, it can be confidently assumed that terrain can have detrimental impacts 
upon fighting ability, and the will of troops to continue fighting with the highest vigour. In 
regards to the marshland and forests of the eastern Netherlands, modern warfare 
techniques incorporating heavy vehicles, such as tanks and troop carriers, became 
identifiably more difficult. This is key within the evidence explored throughout this chapter.  
However, for a greater visual understanding, video footage provides a good insight to the 
trouble conditions and terrain could have upon military logistics, such as supply and 
transport. Footage (See below) produced by Army Film and Photographic Unit, shows both 
heavy and light vehicles from the 11th Armoured Division, getting stuck in mud and hindered 
by macerated roads following the British advance into Overloon.103  
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Source 1.01104  
“Footage of Poor-Quality Roads Affect Vehicle Movement In The Overloon-Venraij Sector Of 
8th Corps Front” 
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The condition of the roads - made clear by the footage - shows the exertion necessary for 
manoeuvring vehicles. This is made clear by the numerous instances of trucks, jeeps and 
other heavy vehicles requiring assistance.  
From this, it can be surely inferred that the effectiveness of the 11th Armoured Division was 
hindered, as extra time would be required to assure vehicles did not get stuck. Along with 
this, issues would arise surrounding counter attacks by enemy artillery. However, aside from 
this footage, which while useful in illustrating some roads, does not provide the same 
insights as those present at the battles. Subsequently, there is a lot to be gained from 
examination of oral testimony of combatants, to both verify and allow for an emotional 
response to the difficulties faced.  
 
Indicators of Morale 
 
To provide a means of recognising and quantifying periods of high and low morale, 
Jonathan Fennell identifies symptoms of periods of low morale. Whilst indirectly related to 
weather conditions and terrain, factors such as sickness, battle fatigue and self-inflicted 
wounds can be viewed as signs of low morale. In the case of the period following September 
1944 for example, figures for those taken ‘sick’ after the failure of Market Garden, rose from 
‘933’ on 23rd September 1944 to ‘1760’ - just one week later. On the 14th October, during 
the battle of Overloon, the figure was at ‘1540’, and spiked to ‘2018’ by the 28th October.105 
These figures can be due to a number of factors; however, it would seem likely that during 
periods of high exertion, conflict and stress both physical and mental, rates for sickness 
would increase. A correlation of reported sickness and low morale following defeat and the 
hard fighting becomes apparent.  
The difficulty with Fennell’s work however, is the failure to define the notion of those ‘taken 
sick’ and what categorises or delineates military sicknesses. The assumption alludes to the 
fact that there is a strong correlation between the numbers of reported sickness and the 
measurement of low morale. Whilst it is understandable that individual cases of sickness 
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may, in many circumstances, be out of reach of a historian armed only with archives and 
repositories, clarification on what classified as ‘sick’ may be useful in determining its 
relationship to morale. In addition, there may be instances, for example an individual may 
fake an illness to avoid a battle. 
It is not unusual for historians to use sickness as a gauging factor of morale within armies, 
Vanda Wilcox in her study of the morale of the Italian army in the First World War uses 
sickness and ill-discipline to suggest that Italian morale was eroding on the Isonzo front in 
the winter of 1915.106 Though similarly to Fennell, Wilcox does not explain what the causes 
of sickness are, and in what way that relates to morale. Fennell’s use of ailments such as 
battle fatigue, which are deemed the result of conflict, are more reliable means of gaining a 
quantifiable interpretation of military morale, as sickness could vary from influenza and 
venereal diseases to typhoid or cholera.  
Whilst this may be true, as identified by Fennell – sickness and more importantly the cause 
of sickness is a complex subject. As Fennell argues, morale factors such as boredom, may 
influence the health of an army. Sickness because of venereal disease (VD) was prevalent in 
October 1944 within the 21st Army Group.107 Fennell uses this as a key identifier of boredom 
and low morale within the British and Commonwealth forces, leading to promiscuity, 
resulting - on the week ending 7th October – the “equivalent in a year to the total strength 
of a division” reporting incidences of VD.108 This issue was of such concern to “manpower 
difficulties”, that Montgomery issued a message to commanding officers stating that “we 
cannot afford to lose a single man unnecessarily”.109 Thus, we can see that endogenous 
factors such as boredom and sickness (when properly classified) can be useful identifiers of 
troop morale.   
This chapter therefore, aims to juxtapose Fennell’s quantifiable work on morale of the 21st 
Army Group in this, with personal testimony from combatants present at the Battle of 
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Overloon in October 1944. It will argue that the stagnation in morale after the failure of 
Operation Market Garden was heavily influenced by weather conditions paired with the 
terrain of the region around Overloon and Venraij. These factors hindered the capability of 
British forces whilst aiding the German defence.  
 
Battle Fatigue 
 
Cases of battle fatigue and psychological signs of low morale, are useful in 
quantifying the fluctuation of British morale throughout the Second World War. This is 
fundamentally due to the fact that it can provide information for new areas of study, in 
terms of endogenous and exogenous stimuli. However, it must be noted that whilst the new 
Directorate of Army Psychiatry – set up to ensure greater numbers of troops returning to 
the front lines – was established during the Second World War in prelude to D- Day on 6th 
June 1944, many commanders viewed this as a means of easy escape from battle for 
servicemen, without the requirements of being physically wounded.110 Therefore, the 
suggestion was made that this was due cowardice and unwillingness to fight, being the 
cause rather than real psychological health problems.111 Though in this study, this 
assumption, if true, could aid our understanding of morale as it may be a causative factor to 
‘fake’ an illness, or avoid through cowardice. Though it would be extremely difficult to verify 
cases of feigned psychological illness.  
Focus on the psychological state of troops was intensified after World War I.112 in 1922 it 
was the view of Field Marshal Lord Gort that “in face of strong morale and esprit de corps 
‘‘shell shock’’ would be practically non-existent”.113 The new policy adopted by psychiatrists 
in the prelude to the invasion of Normandy, was one that aimed to see those soldiers at risk 
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of a ‘break down’, discharge them or move to non – combat roles, leaving the most resilient 
fighting.114  
Keeping this in mind, and using research from Fennell (see below) we can see an increase, 
after Operation ‘Market Garden’, in reported psychological and physiological cases for 
British troops. Fennell uses a table (1.02) to indicate Monthly Sick, Battle Exhaustion (BE), 
Desertion/AWOL (Absent without Leave) and Self-Inflicted Wounds (SIW) per rate of 1000 
soldiers in the British Second Army.  
Source 1.02 
“Monthly Sick, Battle Exhaustion (BE), Desertion/AWOL and SIW Rates per 1,000 in Second 
Army, June 1944 to April 1945” 
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From Fennell’s table (1.02), it is evident that after September and the failure at Arnhem, 
there is an increase in all but one of his chosen categories. Self-inflicted wounds however 
remained stagnant during the two months – September and October. Aside from the no 
evident increase in SIWs, a possible reason for the increase in all other categories - if we are 
to assume these factors correlate with periods of low morale - is that this was in part due to 
the previous defeat.  
Another explanation, made when observing the months October to December - which see 
increases in every category - may be the result of other endogenous and exogenous stimuli 
impacting the morale of British troops. For example, fighting conditions are a plausible 
exogenous factor for an increase in exertion and difficulty and subsequent morale 
deterioration.115 To confirm the relationship between elements such as battle exhaustion 
and morale, Fennell uses ‘Censorship Summaries’ of the same period to gauge troop 
willingness amongst the Second Army (Source 1.03).  
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Source 1.03116 
“Morale Description and scores based on the Censorship Summaries, Second Army, June 
1944 to April 1945” 
This table (1.03), which gauges morale based on qualitative studies of documents such as 
letter, shows a strong correlation between the combined figures on table (1.02) and the 
deemed level of morale. In other words, the higher total on the former correlates to a lower 
score, and a less positive state on the latter.117 
Battle fatigue is a recurring theme within the oral testimony at the Imperial War Museum. 
Private Joseph Fuller of the Suffolk Regiment, is an example of this. After his experience 
fighting at Overloon, Fuller was taken to a battle school to recover from battle fatigue in 
nearby Helmond.118 Fuller described himself as “not frighten, just shaken” from what he had 
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experienced during the battle. From this, it can be assumed that Fuller is playing down the 
difficulty he faced with his mental health. Indeed, to make this point clearer, Fuller 
acknowledges that although he was taken to the school to learn ‘camouflage’ and ‘how to 
be a sniper’, the school was “only a reason of taking me out of battle”.119  
Fatigue is also present in the testimony of tank driver Robert Dare of the 4th Coldstream 
Guards, 6th Guards Tank Brigade.120 He tells of his experience of being blown up in a 
minefield during the attack on Overloon, whilst driving a Churchill tank. He recalls how he 
attempted to save members of his crew whilst being dazed and injured from the 
explosion.121 He was taken to hospital and out of battle for some months to recover.  
To fully grasp the severity of battle fatigue, Dare illustrates one condition he suffered, which 
was the loss of his ability to speak.122 This was until he spent some time undergoing 
hypnotism in order to regain his speech.123 Dare claims that he was told his symptoms 
effects were the result of Battle Fatigue.124 
Hightower asserts that morale is defined in physiological terms as the ability to “maintain 
tension over a period of time”.125 Taking Hightower’s definition into account, it cannot be 
argued convincingly that episodes of battle fatigue, as such experienced by Dare and Fuller, 
can be correlated with satisfactory levels of morale.  
Aside from actual cases of battle fatigue, the psychological impact of the conflict, 
particularly in the period after the break out of Normandy is well noted by Edward Lloyd of 
the 2nd Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment. Lloyd recalls the experience of witnessing the 
death of an officer suffering with shock.126  
A psychological and emotional perspective is present through much of the interviews also. 
Albert Holdsworth of the same battalion as Lloyd, makes this evident in the manner in which 
he recalls the battle of Overloon, describing it simply and subtly as “rough”. Though it is 
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clear that Holdsworth is understating the battle as is evident through his depressed manner 
of speech. Holdsworth pauses frequently throughout his description of the battle, which 
could be inferred as emotionally straining, punctuated by a number of sighs and exhalations. 
The vocal aspect of testimony by Holdsworth does give the impression of reflective anguish. 
Therefore, it is evident that there exists some form of negative emotional attachment to the 
battle for Holdsworth, proving the psychologically straining nature of the battle.  
It would be improper to assert that these episodes of battle fatigue and psychological drain, 
were due solely to conditions and terrain of the proximity of Overloon and Venraij, as it is 
evidently not true. These men in their testimony, acknowledge they had been fighting since 
the invasion of Normandy in June 1944.127  
Indeed, the value of the testimony of both Dare and Fuller is that they prove, during the 
Battle of Overloon that there was a proportion of troops that had been fighting for four 
months. Thus, the impact of smaller, ‘mundane’ factors, as Roy calls it, such as rain and cold 
can be viewed as being additional issues placed upon months of vigorous fighting, which the 
troops had to deal with. To prove this, there are a number of instances throughout the 
testimony studied in which conditions are referred. Thus, showing that it was a notable 
factor for those who had fought at Overloon.  
 
The Impact of Bad Weather at the Battle of Overloon 
 
From the testimony studied at the Imperial War Museum, the impact of the poor 
weather clearer had an erosive effect upon the morale of the men. This is without the 
inclusion of other factors such as terrain. It is identifiable due to the generally negative 
connotations held to the experience of being in rain and cold weather.  
The attack on the village of Overloon, was originally planned for the 11th October 1944, but 
due to rain the operation was held off until the following day.128 Herbert William Brown, a 
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tank driver and British NCO serving with 4th Battalion Coldstream Guards, described this 
delayed start to the Battle of Overloon; 
We started a lot of action in Holland, all around Venraij, Venlo, Overloon. The Battle 
of Overloon… they had to put it off for twenty-four hours, it poured [emphasis] with 
rain. We had the 3rd British Division with us then, infantry division, everybody was 
soaked.129 
The manner in which Brown speaks is notable, as he emphasises words such as ‘poured’, 
which is dragged out for a greater effect. From the emphasis on this word and in the context 
that this interview was held in 2000, fifty-six years after the event. A logical assumption can 
made that the impact of the rain was sufficient enough to remain a present memory for 
Brown. In addition, proof of the suggestion that the rain inhibited the movement of British 
forces is already made distinct, as the operation was postponed for twenty-four hours. 
Brown continues describing that under the circumstances, he and his crew would often play 
the card game ‘cribs’ in the tank waiting to dry off.130 It would get to such a point within the 
tank, that “you’d have a job to see one an’ other” because of the vapour of drying 
clothes.131 When the rain stopped, Brown would start the tank and use the “terrific heat” of 
the exhaust to dry the crew’s clothes “in a few minutes”.132  
Brown’s testimony tells us a lot about the effect of the rain, it can be inferred that the 
soaking was substantial enough to inhibit any action. Given his manner of speech, and the 
contents of his narrative, it is clear that at the time this may not have been a completely 
pleasant experience. Harking back to the fact that it has remained present in his mind for 
such a long period, also show the significance of the downpour.  
Though as tank driver, we get an image of how situations such as these may have been 
positive for crew relationships, as in the case of Brown, he would play cards with his co- 
driver as a means of passing the time, whether this was substantial enough to make the 
experience pleasant, Brown does not specify.133 Thus, there is room here to argue that the 
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rain had a beneficial role in bolstering the morale of units such as tank crews, who used the 
time to enjoy each other’s company. Although, this does not prove substantial for those 
troops not in the shelter of a tank. 
The impact of poor weather upon the 21st Army Group at Overloon is apparent nonetheless, 
as the fact that the attack was postponed proves that the rain prevented effective battle 
and created a necessity for shelter. Ernest Goozee of the 2nd Battalion, East Yorkshire 
Regiment, tells of a similar experience upon arrival at Overloon; 
But the weather had turned so bad, that it was all mud, so the vehicles and tanks 
couldn’t get through at all, so we had to lay low during the rain. Twenty-four hours I 
think it was, before we could do battle to capture Overloon.134 
Goozee’s testimony validates the suggestion that weather inhibited both tank and troop 
movement at the battle. Poor weather is also referenced in the testimony of Alec Pugh of 
2nd Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment, who struggles to fully recall the battle though 
acknowledges that “it was wet and miserable, I know that much”.135 As well as this, Thomas 
Jones of the 4th Battalion King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, has a similarly negative stance in 
regard to the weather conditions of the period. When he was asked by the interviewer what 
the weather was like, he responds, “terrible, wet, cold, I can’t remember any fine days in 
that part”.136 
Testimony such as this is mirrored by Reginald Rutherford, an officer in the 2nd Battalion 
East Yorkshire Regiment. During his time in the region of the Netherlands, Rutherford 
recalled the experience as “dreadful weather and dreadful places to be”.137 He then re-
emphasises the conditions encountered preluding the battle of Overloon during his 
description, stating “it was raining, terribly bad weather”.138 This adds to the assumption 
that these weather conditions, impacted the individual morale of Rutherford and of the 
troops of 21st Army Group more widely.  
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With reference to the variety of testimony studied, which details an individual’s entire 
military experience of the Second World War, there are limited occurrences when weather 
conditions are referred to whilst giving descriptions of their experiences. These descriptions 
tend to come when the weather is particularly remarkable, as in the circumstances at 
Overloon and Venraij, thus proving the severity of the conditions. 
As well as this, terminology is important when determining emotional connections to 
memories. For example, Goozee’s use of the word “bad”. Rutherford’s persistent reference 
to the rain as “dreadful” or describing the weather as “terribly bad”. Pugh’s use of the term 
“miserable”. All of these terms are related to negative connotations.  
In the opinion of psychologist Joel R. Davitz and of this thesis, “the words a subject uses in 
describing an emotional experience do indeed reflect or refer to some aspect of that 
experience”.139 Consequently, when the interviewee uses such negative terminology, they 
are doing so because their experience reflects the negativity of the chosen term. However, 
from this psychological perspective, the argument could be posed that the description and 
labelling of an event can differ depending on each individual’s definition of the terminology 
they are using.140 Although, to indulge this work into a phenomenological debate detracts 
from the intent of this thesis. In which case, the negative connotations associated with 
these words shall be upheld. 
Davitz’s view is useful in the study of morale, as assumptions such as these allow us to 
understand the emotional attachment of terminology in regards to the morale of the 
individual during the period. Simply put, negative terms equate to negative experience, 
thus, we can assume lower morale, particularly when combined with Fennell’s quantitative 
research of the period (Source 0.05).  
Moving away from the psychoanalysis of terminology, the poor conditions also provided 
some physical effects to the landscape and the ability to wage war. In the battle for 
Overloon and Venraij, this become evident in the excess of water in this marshy and 
wooded region of the Netherlands. 
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Rain and Terrain at Overloon 
 
Rain made the terrain unsuitable for the movement of tanks and heavy vehicles, it 
also gave the defensive advantage to the Wehrmacht and inhibited successful logistical 
warfare for the 21st Army Group. Arthur Rouse, an officer in 1st Battalion South Lancashire 
Regiment makes this clear as he describes that there was no shelter from the deteriorating 
weather, the ground was not suitable for tanks and vehicles and also there was great 
difficulty feeding his men.141  
At Overloon, Rouse talks of a Company who did not receive a hot meal until two o’ clock in 
the morning, which was the first time that had happened in the whole war, due to the 
shelling of roads.142 Given the condition of roads and passages to the village it can be 
assumed that these too would have hindered the successful movement of food trucks. 
Consequently, the complexity of the impact of the rain at Overloon is more apparent. As it is 
not just the unpleasant nature of being exposed to rain and cold, but logistics and the 
inability to move supplies such as food to the troops becomes another deteriorative factor 
for morale.  
The diary of General Lashmer G. Whistler provides us with a personal insight to the effects 
of rain and the terrain. He states that the area in which Operation Constellation was fought, 
was full of “bags of mines and desperate mud. Churchills (Tank) bogging down everywhere. 
Bridges collapsing – in fact every blood thing quite bloody”.143  
Reginal Rutherford supports Whistler’s statement, claiming that the area around Overloon 
and Venraij was “all flooded”.144 This led to tanks being “bogged down completely”, fitting 
with Whistler’s account of the battle.145 This was fundamentally due to the geographic 
location of Overloon and Venraij which were in a wooded and marshy region of the 
Netherlands, making the movement of tanks difficult.146 Arthur Blizzard of Pioneer Platoon, 
1st Battalion Suffolk Regiment highlights the challenges set by the marshy terrain, stating 
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that if you were to “dig six inches, you got six inches of water in, you couldn’t get down you 
see”.147 Blizzard is referring here to the inability to build slit trenches for defensive cover 
due to the waterlogged ground. This further adds to the fact that terrain played a 
fundamental role in the way in which the battle could be fought, as well as the ways in 
which British troops could find defensive positions.  
Rutherford also refers to the problems caused by a deep canal known as the Lobeek, which 
needed to be crossed by the British in order to continue pushing forward. At this canal, the 
terrain was used with explosive mines to detriment the British advance. Rutherford notes 
that for the first time, he encountered a water crossing at which the enemy had placed 
explosive mines on both sides of the water.148 In attempting to cross this water obstacle and 
minefield, his Company lost “many men”, forcing two crossings with “tremendous 
difficulty”.149 This illuminates the defensive advantage that can be gained from the use of 
terrain, which proves the hardship endured by the units of the 21st Army Group in their push 
to the Maas river.  
Arthur Blizzard gives another good example of the defensive advantage the Germans held. 
He dictates that enemy troops were able to use a steeple in the nearby town of Venraij to 
gain a good view over the surrounding marshland, pinning the British down.150 This is 
verified by an article from The Times published on the 16th October, it records that this 
steeple which was used as an artillery observation post had been burned down.151 This adds 
weight to the point that the Wehrmacht had a defensive advantage over the British given 
the landscape of the region.  
Douglas Waller makes the difficult encountered by the topography, particularly for vehicles, 
clearer in oral testimony held in 2002; 
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We got involved in quite a battle there (Overloon)… well it was a ghastly sort of 
place, you didn’t really see anything… you were almost firing at shadows, ideal 
infantry country.152 
Waller also gives us an insight to the potential for enemy defence given the terrain they 
were faced with. When asked about the opposition faced;   
Oh, it was very fierce, all the way, they were set up points within the forest on the 
thing, there was only one main road going through.153 
This ferocity addressed by the testimony of Waller is echoed in that of Brown. As upon being 
asked what happened to him during the battle, he responded;  
“What happened to me? Well, I managed to survive it.”154   
The close examination of terminology here is imperative in the understanding of Brown’s 
experience of the battle. Claiming that he “managed to survive” the battle at Overloon, 
gives clear implications that the battle was an experience in which Brown deems his survival 
an achievement. Consequently, from this testimony, the nature of the battle become more 
evident as it must have been substantially difficult and hard-fought to have only “managed 
to survive”.155  
The combination of terrain and conditions gave a defensive advantage to the Germans. As is 
clear from footage of churned up roads, the marshy and forested landscape inhibited 
effective deployment of heavy vehicles and led to a battle which was led by infantry units.156 
Charles Forrester also notes that the area “was flat and suited the defence… It was to be yet 
another close-quarter infantry slogging match”.157  
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Ernest Goozee verifies this in his testimony, by claiming that the fighting was dominated by 
the sounds of Sten and Bren guns.158 This is again backed up by Waller, who also emphasises 
the high employment of infantry units at Overloon, and the fact that the terrain type 
inhibited the effective deployment of tanks.159 As we will explore later in this thesis, “the 
ferocity of German resistance” was intensified, as it was “now driven by the fact that the 
Wehrmacht was now fighting on the border of the Reich”.160 
The rain and poor weather were not constant features of the battles however, as the attack 
did commence on the 12th October 1944. The next issue detrimental to morale was the 
impact of barrages and artillery on terrain. A depiction of the battleground is made by John 
Ward, which shows a landscape filled with craters and burned trees. It gives a clear 
impression of the destruction metered out upon the landscape.161  
Devastation as depicted by Ward’s sketch adds to the view that manoeuvrability would have 
been greatly restricted by the terrain. As well as this, from this picture an it can be better 
understood how there was a lack in defensive positions for the British. This added to the 
defensive advantage held by the German forces in the villages of Overloon and Venraij. 
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Source 1.04 
“A Back Garden at Overloon, Holland by John Ward”  
 
Ernest Goozee’s account of the impact of artillery barrages from both British and German 
guns upon the village adds to the totality of Overloon’s destruction. He explains that 
Overloon “was well bombed”.162 To the extent that “there was no buildings left. Complete 
what’s name”.163 Goozee’s account whilst colloquialised, makes apparent the absolute 
destruction of the village.  
Indeed, on the opening day of the attack, “four artillery regiments with medium guns and a 
battery with heavy guns, altogether 68 pieces” fired upon the village.164 Air support was also 
made available from Hawker Typhoons of 83 Group RAF and USAAF (United States Army Air 
Force) Martin Marauders.165 Ernest Goozee continues;  
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Where the buildings had been severed by bomb damage and that, we dug holes, slit 
trenches. We barricaded the top with doors off buildings, for our own protection as 
much as we could… Jerry had bombed that so much that there was hardly a building 
standing.166  
This further proves that the Germans had the defensive advantage during the battle of 
Overloon as British soldiers had to suffice with unsuitable terrain, which was hard to 
constructed slit trenches for cover. As well as this, there were limited buildings left standing 
for protection from bullets or the weather. Thus, making the battle much more difficult and 
costlier for the British, which would further wear down the British will to fight on. 
The testimony of Robert Dare makes the nature of the struggle for this region ever more 
apparent. When discussing the brigade’s movement toward Venraij and Overloon, a stark 
description of battle is given;  
It was absolute hell, we were shelled, there were ‘moaning minnies’, there were 
some infantry about but not a lot, but It was a real tank scrap battle. And we lost 
many, many tanks, through ‘Tiger’ tanks, because they couldn’t cross the river you 
see they were trapped.167 
Dare gives us an insight into the other difficulties faced by the advancing 21st Army group in 
the region because of the restrictive nature of the terrain and conditions. This testimony 
also makes clear the amount of challenges faced by the 21st Army Group, not only in conflict 
but bound by poor terrain made worse by rain. However, with Dare’s testimony, we 
discover an issue with reliability, because of his reference to ‘Tiger’ tanks. The ‘Tiger’ Tank 
or Panzerkampfwagen VI, is iconic in the debate surrounding tank design during the Second 
World War, namely due to the fact it was viewed as a superior design to that of Allied tanks 
at the time.168  
What is interesting is that “the Allies reported more encounters with Tigers than any other 
German type”.169 This is evident in the testimony of Robert Dare, although it does place 
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questions of reliability onto his description and those of other reportings, as only 1354 Tiger 
I’s were ever created.170 This is opposed to 8,540 German Panzer IV’s and approximately 
53,500 US Sherman tanks produced.171. Therefore, it is unlikely that there would have been 
a lot of these machines in the proximity. Also, when considering the military fronts that Nazi 
Germany were fighting, and the fact that these tanks entered service in 1943, the likelihood 
decreases further.172 Even when the successor to the Tiger name - the Tiger II - entered 
production, only 489 were produced.173  
Thus, it is evident that when dealing with oral testimony, there is the possibility that, in this 
instance, tanks are misidentified or pieces of evidence are missed or manipulated in order 
to form a solid narrative. Nevertheless, for this thesis, this provides a good insight to the 
fear that Dare had about his opponent’s tank, and shows a lot about how British troops felt 
about going into combat during the period. Therefore, this allows us to gauge that this was 
likely to have been a contributing factor to the deterioration of morale.  
This chapter has made clear that after the failure of Operation ‘Market Garden’, operations 
such as ‘Constellation’ were erosive to the troop morale. In this instance the poor autumnal 
weather of the Eastern Netherlands, combined with marshy waterlogged terrain, proved to 
be not only an unpleasant experience but gave the potential for greater casualties. Jonathan 
Fennell’s quantitative research of morale proved that there was a dip in morale of the 21st 
Army Group following their defeat at Arnhem (See table 0.05).174 
The two exogenous elements of rain and terrain, worked in unison to make the attack more 
difficult for the British. This in turn gave a greater defensive advantage to the Wehrmacht, 
leading to much more hard fought battles faced. This was evidently a contributing factor to 
an increase in numbers of troops suffering conditions such as battle fatigue and sickness. 
Though it must be remembered that these are merely contributory factors. Issues such as 
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continued conflict since the Invasion of Normandy in June 1944, may also be fundamental to 
the detriment of British morale.  
The study of oral testimony in this instance, has been useful in evaluating, to some extent, 
the emotional memory held by the interviewee. Whilst a lot of research of testimony of this 
kind is bound by assumption, particularly through that of emotional memory – it is clear 
when presented with transcriptions that this period of fighting was, in the most part, a 
horrendous experience in the individual lives of the sample group. What adds to this study is 
the interviewees ability, through what was predominantly open questioning, to identify 
endogenous and exogenous factors impacting morale. Those, of course were fundamental 
to this thesis.  
Another important factor which comes as a given especially when discussing military 
history, is the effectiveness of the enemy. Relevant in this study in particular, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter – but the terrain and conditions faced at Overloon and Venraij 
would have, without doubt been only minor inconveniences had it not been for a 
determined, fanaticised military force opposing virtually every inch of ground taken. 
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Chapter 2 – Resurgence of the Wehrmacht 
 
The decision to launch the airborne assault in the Netherlands in September 1944 
was founded upon the belief that the German war machine had been broken. This was 
because of the massive retreat to more defensible land by remaining Wehrmacht forces.175 
This erroneous strategic move made by Allied command proved to be a morale disaster for 
the 21st Army Group, as is evident by the quantitative research by Jonathan Fennell.176  
Whilst the failure of Operation ‘Market Garden’ had a detrimental impact to the 21st Army 
Group both physically and mentally. The unpredicted resurgence in the Wehrmacht’s 
fighting ability proved to be a contributing factor to the future difficulties faced by 
Montgomery’s army. The clearing of the region of the Netherlands to secure the salient to 
the west of the River Maas, exemplified this resurgence in the “Iron discipline” and fighting 
ability of the German forces.177 
It was by this stage becoming apparent that capitulation was not on the agenda for the 
German high command. This was made clear by the persistence of German leaders to 
display assurance and hopefulness that victory was still a possibility.178 Then upon the 
penetration of Germany by the allied forces, the mantra being espoused from the Reich 
chancellery was one of “win or die!”.179 Thus, poking the hot coals of fanaticism within the 
ranks of the German military. 
The resulting issues that were faced by Montgomery’s 21st Army Group – as made evident 
by the previous chapter – including a difficult fighting environment and prolonged battles 
against well defended positions. As a result of this, battles such as that at Overloon and 
Venraij proved to be fought with much more ferocity and bloodshed.  
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Operations following ‘Market Garden’, as stated by Major General G. P. B. Roberts, were 
“quite different to anything we had met before… now we came up against natural obstacles, 
sometimes fortified and sometimes not, but when held by the Germans they needed a lot of 
effort”.180 The maintenance of high morale and the limitation of casualties were, as Charles 
Forrester puts it, “were further issues to address”.181 
A good means of identifying Allied perception toward the fighting capabilities of the 
Wehrmacht is present at the National Archives. Reports to the Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) on ‘Enemy Morale’ throughout 1944 provide an insight to 
Allied presumptions.182 ‘SHAEF Special G-2 Summary No. 6’ produced on the 21st August 
1944, documents the perception of German capability present in Allied high command after 
the successful invasion of Normandy.183 It states;  
Latest morale picture shows no significant change. Morale in SS and Parachute formations 
still very high though there have been recent examples of desertion by personnel of former. 
General signs of dissatisfaction due to lack of air and tank support among infantry units. 
Proportion of troops who still think Germans will win war about one fifth, but no solid ideas 
as to how this is to be achieved.184  
It is worth bearing in mind that this particular report does not document the proximity in 
which these Schutzstaffel (SS) and parachute formations were fighting. That being said, this 
report shows that the organisation more closely related to the National Socialist regime - 
the SS - was viewed by the Allies as being more confident in battle. The fact that the SS was 
intrinsically related to the Nazi regime, could be argued to be a predictable state for the 
fanatics.185  
Although, it was not merely the SS and the Fallschirmjäger (German parachutists) who were 
incited by the will of the Nazi machine. This was proven to Winston Churchill from an 
‘ULTRA’ intelligence ‘Special Message’. This message documented on the 22nd July 1944, a 
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telegram from Hitler for General Karl-Wilhelm von Schlieben of the Wehrmacht to “defend 
to the last pillbox” and that “every enemy attack must be shattered”.186 Thomas Kuhne, in 
his book The Rise and Fall of Comradeship argues that the Wehrmacht were not innocent 
from the fanaticism of the Third Reich. Indeed, Kuhne points out that the “draconian 
military justice” of the Wehrmacht was indeed a contributing factor to the brutalisation and 
barbarisation of German soldiers.187 From which, it can be argued that commands of these 
types could be a fundamental factor behind the resilience of the German defence.  
However, at this point in 1944 the fact that from this report only one – fifth of German 
troops believed in victory, shows a devastating blow to morale. M. I. Gurfein and Morris 
Janowitz validate this in their study of the morale of the Wehrmacht who note that in June 
and July less than fifty per-cent of the captured German prisoners of war (POW) believed 
they could remove the Allied force from France.188 This acknowledgement of the frail nature 
of the German POWs, helped to structure the belief that the Wehrmacht was under severe 
strain on a psychological level.  
Although the adoption of the view of POWs does not provide an accurate interpretation of 
the whole German force. This is quite obviously due to the fact that these men had been 
taken captive at the hands of enemy soldiers, so it is not unreasonable to assume that their 
answers to the questions given to them, may be biased to put them in good stead with their 
captors. Nonetheless, it is clear how information such as this prior to the decision to launch 
‘Market Garden’ may have founded Allied strategy for the defeat of Germany.  
Though, this telegram shows the German response relatively soon after the Allied invasion 
of western Europe. Dated September 1944, another SHAEF report documents the view held 
about the morale of the German military. SHAEF Report G-2 Special Summary No. 7 proves 
this absolute underestimation of the Wehrmacht. Through the use colloquialisms the 
perception of the Allies becomes apparent, “Considerable evidence that enemy has had 
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stuffing knocked out of him and present outlook of soldier is near one of bewilderment and 
helplessness brought on by our ability to move rapidly and bypass him”.189  
Addressing the Germans as bewildered and helpless and as having the “stuffing knocked out 
of them” proves that there was a solid belief of the imminent capitulation of the enemy. As 
well as this reference is made to the motorisation of the British forces in the break out from 
Normandy and the subsequent pursuit of the retreating German forces, as they are now 
able to “bypass” the Germans. Interestingly, the report also refers to German divisions 
having “lost so much equipment that they have not adequate arms with which to fight”. 
This can be understood as being further evidence, in the view of SHAEF of the impending 
collapse of the Wehrmacht, as they no longer have the military ‘materiel’ to continue the 
fight.  
Already, a clear picture is being unveiled of the assumptions held by SHAEF. It was believed 
at this point that German “determination to fight is very lacking, particularly among infantry 
formations”. This was made evident through the desertion of troops, who “fled under great 
stress” during the decimation of the Wehrmacht at the battle of the Falaise Pocket.190 
Though, the report clarified that, “it cannot be said yet there has been complete collapse in 
morale”.191  
A potential explanation is given in the statement’s study of the opinions of captured young 
officers as according to the report they, “generally still believe in possibility of German 
victory. Most senior Officers now realise inevitability of defeat.”192 Dividing the 
demographics of officers between young and old, we can see that the indoctrinated youth 
still uphold the belief in the domination of the Third Reich, as opposed to the elder officers 
who acknowledge the nation’s demise. The fanatical youth being the target goal of Hitler 
who famously stated “whoever has the youth has the future”.193 Thus, it should come as no 
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surprise that a regime that intended to indoctrinate the youth with National Socialist 
ideology, resulted in a highly zealous young command with the Wehrmacht.194 
Whilst this report does not state specifically the date in September, it can be confidently 
assumed that this was prior to the assault at Arnhem, this is also made evident given the 
reference to the battle of the Falaise Pocket (8-17 August 1944). The image mage portrayed 
by this report shows the crucial influencing factors upon the strategy of the following 
campaign. It can be seen that the view of German weakness was instrumental in deciding 
Montgomery’s plan of a singular thrust to Berlin. This is apparent in his letter to Eisenhower, 
in which Montgomery argued that “we have now reached a stage where one really powerful 
and full-blooded thrust towards Berlin is likely to get there and thus end the German 
war”.195 This strategy however, would result in the end of what had been – according to 
Source 0.05 - a sharp drop in morale for 21st Army Group.  
The historiographical issue of the cause of the failure at Arnhem – whether it was the 
limitations placed on Monty’s plan by Eisenhower or whether the plan was just 
fundamentally flawed - is irrelevant to this study. What is relevant however, is the fact that 
the decision to launch this failed attack - although it may have been a risk worth taking from 
the perspective of the British-196 led to the erosion of morale amongst troops of the 21st 
Army Group.  The failure also led to the discovery of the fact that the Wehrmacht had 
stopped their retreat and were able to mobilise into a fighting force.197 
The subsequent report in the series proves SHAEF’s underestimation in the fighting 
capability of the German forces. It acknowledges that after ‘Market Garden’, the “enemy 
has recovered his stability after period of collapse and, although still confused, is showing 
more spirit in his fighting”.198 Following this “period of collapse” it is noted that the “enemy 
has now more cohesion on his front than he had at any time since Allied break out in 
NORMANDY”.199 There is a staunch contrast between this report and its predecessor. It 
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appears that there has been a complete reversal in the Allied assumption of German 
capability. 
The report refers also to possible factors the maintenance of morale amongst the enemy 
troops, explaining that “he (troops of the Wehrmacht) is defending the Fatherland, in many 
cases in good defensive positions or in the prepared West Wall positions”.200 This gives an 
insight to the following difficulties that would be faced by the 21st Army Group in battles 
such as that at Overloon. The defensive positions, namely the Siegfried line, on the western 
border of Germany are highlighted as a source of these issues of German morale. These pre-
prepared positions, would also prove a difficult challenge for the subsequent campaign to 
break into Germany. 
The difficulty to be encountered by the British is shown by the reports suggestion that the 
Germans had a “certain proportion men with spirit. These make up for their lack of skill by 
aggressiveness”.201 From this, it is clear that SHAEF were wrong in thinking that German 
forces were on the brink of collapse, both in a strategic and morale sense – as clearly there 
was a renewed fighting ability prevalent following ‘Market Garden’. Not only was there 
resilience in terms of morale, but this report documents the creation of new German 
divisions, going as far to state that, “some new divisions have fought very well, notably 553, 
559 and the battalion under 176 Division”.202 This proves that the allied presumption was 
mistaken, leading to the view of the report being that “no evidence of any signs of collapse 
and in present circumstances of fighting consider this unlikely”.203 
The reports reference to the ‘spirit’ of the German soldiers, which notes that their lack in 
skill was compensated by aggression, follows on from the assumption made earlier of the 
fanaticism of the troops of the Wehrmacht. The report goes as far as to state that amongst 
“junior officers” there is “an air of optimism based apparently on faith in HITLER”. Though 
the report continues to state that “their views are quite illogical”.204 Thus, this provides 
further evidence to support the claim that a driving factor behind the Wehrmacht was 
founded upon fanaticism with the Nazi state. Indeed, ideology is identified in source 0.04 as 
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a key exogenous factor in the contribution and maintenance of morale within an armed 
force.  
Given what has been previously discussed, and assuming this framework of contributing 
factors to morale (source 0.04), it is apparent how fanaticism within the Wehrmacht would 
play an important role to maintain a fighting will. This resolve to continue is made clear 
within the report, proving to be contradictory to the Allied belief that the Wehrmacht were 
close to breaking point and that an end in the war was in sight.205 To further oppose this 
belief the report points out the creation of successful division with the German forces, 
further damning the mistake made by the Allies in underestimating their opponent. 
Whilst a date is not present on this document it can be confidently asserted that this 
followed ‘Market Garden’. Reasons for this include the period of time spaced between each 
report in the series often exceeding a month. With this in mind, report No. 7 was dated 
September, therefore, report No. 8 must have been produced in autumn or winter following 
the operation.  
However, present at the National Archives was another report entitled, “G-2 Special 
Summary Number 8”.206 This report however, whilst sharing the digit ‘8’, is dated 22nd 
November 1944, thus unsure of the relation to the former entitled as No. 8, this thesis will 
treat both documents as individual sources. The report maintains a similar tone to its 
counterpart, stating that there are, “No signs of any collapse in will to resist at the front”.207 
It explains that the cause of this hard resistance is due to the “Iron discipline of 
WEHRMACHT and SS”.208 which is pointed out by Kuhne as providing a basis for the 
continued struggle of the brutal German troops.209  
Another factor that the report identifies is the notion of defending the German ‘Fatherland’, 
which acted as another morale strengthening element. Defending their homeland instilled 
“into troops a desperate resolve to retreat no further”.210 This was exacerbated by the 
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commanding officers within the Wehrmacht, leading troops to “stand fast and protect the 
sacred soil of the Fatherland”.211 To further this concept, the report explains that German 
propaganda played a role in the maintenance of morale, by binding their defeat to the 
complete “annihilation of German Nation in the event of defeat”.212 Hence, it is clear that 
the report identified that a key contributing factor to the resilience of the Wehrmacht in its 
defence of Germany, was the influence of ideology and propaganda. 
The influence of these exogenous stimuli was also combined, as the reports states, to the 
fact that the Germans were fighting from “well prepared defensive positions” with the 
“protection of concrete”.213 As well as this, the report found that it was the belief of 
captured soldiers that the defence conducted, had in the most part been successful.214 This 
belief in a solid defence can be assumed as being a key factor in the resilience of the 
individual soldier, especially when considering the ideological stance taken by the German 
high command towards its troops. Thus, the report sees that “desertions of true Germans 
very few and when they occur are usually caused by such things as lack of food or 
inadequate clothing”.215 When examining this report, there is a clear and staunch difference 
between the current and those preceding ‘Market Garden’. Indeed, it is clear that the SHAEF 
reports have misread the situation following the German retreat through France and 
Belgium. This is evident also in the work of Sebastian Ritchie, who argues that the Allies 
completely underestimated the German ability to re-group, re-organise and form a capable 
defence following this period of retreat.216 
The production of this report No. 8 was after the operations at Overloon and Venraij, and 
thus gives us a good insight to the difficulty faced by the 21st Army Group active in combat. 
Even at this stage the report found that according to evidence from those captured, the 
reasons for a resurgence in fight capability was due to, “improved German positions of 
having short supply lines, no partisans to deal with, (and) reserve Divisions”. Though the 
report also gives an insight in the Allied belief of German defeat, noting that these reasons 
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given by the POWs are being perpetuated, “for final victory by those stupid enough to 
believe in it”.217 In particular, this line illuminates the sense of shock for the Allies, as there 
appeared to be no chance of German victory, though for many POWs their fanaticism 
allowed for this confidence in Hitler. Subsequently, this provides us with a greater context of 
the ferocity and determination in which many German soldiers would have fought with in 
the later stages of 1944. 
Conclusive assumptions such as those indicated by the reports were also evident in terms of 
actual fighting. The retreat of German troops from Normandy and the potential total 
annihilation of the army in the battle of the Falaise Pocket, was evidence of the weakness of 
the enemy. The failure to completely destroy the German forces however, appeared to be 
due an Allied inability to capitalise on the entrapment of the enemy, as opposed to any 
other factor.218 This, when twinned with reports on German morale and resilience, would 
prove enticing to get results quickly. As well as this, the view of Montgomery that “The 
British economy and man-power situation demanded victory in 1944: no later” shows 
clearly the arguable over-eagerness to end the war.219 
Whilst the misjudgement of SHAEF in the expectation of the Wehrmacht is clear through 
these variance of the reports on morale and their fighting ability on the battlefield. These 
reports also place into to question the accuracy of the information gathered by SHAEF 
inquiries. The reasons for this in this particular circumstance are the reliance on the words 
of POWs as a source of identifying the mood across a national army. Although, Gurfein and 
Janowitz point out that studies such as these amongst POWs were used to identify some 
trends, rather than act as representative of the enemy force. However, the study relevant to 
their work regarded only the statistical evidence received from one style of information 
extraction - questionnaires.220 Gurfein and Janowitz assert that these questionnaires were 
used only as a means of gauging mood for psychological warfare.221 Considering the 
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publishing date of Gurfein and Janowitz’s – 1946 – their study did not allow substantial time 
for the birth of revisionism surrounding this topic.  
The reports by SHAEF, cover a broader spectrum of information than was studied by these 
two sociologists. By reference to information such as defensive positions and the formation 
of new fighting units, it is clear that there was a complexity, in these SHAEF reports, unlike 
those questionnaires studied by Gurfein and Janowitz. This in turn may have an influencing 
sway upon future strategy and at the very least provide a suitable source for reasoning 
behind strategic decision making.  
Consequently, from such reports it is evident that there was an underestimation of the 
Wehrmacht, founded partially upon recent successes for the Allies, and in part due to the 
assumption of psychological weakness amongst the enemy force. The study which sought to 
identify such psychological frailness was, as discussed, deeply flawed given the situation of 
those sampled. The inaccuracy of the assumption led to a prolonged period of campaigning 
through difficult terrain, under difficult conditions, which simply eroded morale further after 
the already present dip following September 1944. 
Impact on British troops  
 
The resurgence of the Wehrmacht had a detrimental impact upon the morale of the 
21st Army Group. This is primarily due to following a substantial defeat at Arnhem, the 
assumption of imminent collapse was gone and a new fight had to be fought with a 
reformed German military force, defending its border with every means necessary. Thus, 
the problems faced by the resurrection of the Wehrmacht is evident through the testimony 
of British troops that fought in the region. Lionel Roebuck of the 2nd Battalion East 
Yorkshire Regiment makes this evident when describing the first instance of fear he 
experienced whilst fighting around Venraij; 
Up to then I hadn’t been really frightened, but really, I was a bit frightened in that 
corner because dare not go to sleep… there was a farm just up the road and Jerrys 
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were dug in on the other side in the field, about twenty to thirty yards away… we 
weren’t far away from one another.222 
Roebuck’s acknowledgement that it was during this period that he had his first, memorable, 
encounter with fear, validates his difficulty he faced in this operation to secure the Maas 
salient. As well as this, Roebuck’s testimony continues to shed light upon the view that the 
encounter with the German forces in this region, and the incorrect assumption of their 
strength, continued to catalyse the disintegration of the morale of the 21st Army Group.  
To give a reason for the severity of fighting around Overloon and Venraij, Roebuck cites an 
account from a German soldier fighting in the area, whom he befriended in the 1980s. 
According to the German, Wehrmacht officers issued the order to “hold the position and 
then left them”, showing that this would be a fight to the last man.223  
An explanation of the treatment of German soldiers by the British is also made apparent 
through the second-hand account given by Roebuck. He states that his German friend, upon 
being captured by British troops, called to his comrade to surrender and to come out of his 
dug out.224 After doing so a British soldier shot his comrade through the head, killing him.225 
Roebuck’s response to this incident shows the mood amongst British troops during this 
fighting, as he explains that;  
It’s not difficult to understand really, because in that particular battle there were 
loads of instances where the Jerrys waited until the East Yorks’ (regiment) got into a 
clearing in the woods, which they had covered in machine gun, and when they got 
half a platoon in a middle they just let fly, and that was it. It made them very angry, a 
lot of the lads were very angry ‘cos it was a bloody battle there.226 
From this testimony, a stronger image of emotion is revealed. Whilst the first part of this 
story is recited from a second hand account, initially arousing questions surrounding its 
reliability, Roebuck affirms the feeling of anger which was felt by the troops in the region. 
His narrative of the shooting of troops of the East Yorkshire Regiment further verifies the 
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ferocity and bloodiness of this period in 1944. Thus, we can see the contributory factors to 
the erosion of morale within the 21st Army Group.  
Whilst this is the case, it must be noted that individual testimony, though useful on a 
personal level of study, does not present a universal image for the entirety of the British 
force. That being said the consistency of similar experiences shared amongst testimony 
available the refers to this period (within the Imperial War Museum), does show a stark 
correlation revealing the decline in morale. 
A reason for the revival in ability of the German war machine becomes apparent in ULTRA 
intelligence transcripts of German telegrams in late September 1944. Signed by Field 
Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of Staff of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) to 
General der Infanterie Von Scheele, to be circulated generally. The telegram regarded the 
lack of discipline in the Wehrmacht, with the issue being the concern of Hitler and the upper 
echelon of German high command. It states that the, “most serious complaints continue… 
about undisciplined groups wandering back to Holland or to Aachen and through the 
Burgundian gates. Their behaviour is so scandalous that it may be expected to infect the 
West Wall garrison”.227 This telegram reflects the view of the SHAEF reports on German 
morale, that document some bands of desertion and ill-discipline amongst the German 
frontlines during the retreat from France. However, evident in this message, uncovered by 
British intelligence, is the intent by German command to deter capitulation in the western 
theatre.  
By commission of Hitler, “signs of collapse” are to be prevented and given proper 
deterrence as is explained that, “looters and cowardly shirkers (including officers) are to be 
proceeded against on the spot with greatest severity… in the case of soldiers sentence is to 
be carried out immediately as a (deterrent measure). Only the utmost ruthlessness will stop 
this collapse of war morale which menaces our homeland”.228 To maintain morale, Von 
Sheele is given “the right to decide on immediate execution even in the case of officers”.229 
The evidence presented by ULTRA, is useful in supporting the SHAEF report No. 8, which 
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identifies the ‘Iron discipline’ of the Wehrmacht as a maintenance factor of morale.230 The 
threats of execution to be circulated across the force, proves that there were multiple 
endogenous and exogenous stimuli influencing the morale and fighting capability of the 
Wehrmacht.   
What is also interesting is the date of this telegraph, coming three days after the end of 
Operation ‘Market Garden’ an image is portrayed of retreat and disintegration of the 
German military force. This relates to the view held by the Allies of the Wehrmacht’s 
imminent collapse. However, given the fact that the right to execute officers and soldiers to 
deter the issue of undisciplined troops, allows the historian to assume that prior to this, the 
issue may not been as high of a concern amongst German command, otherwise the rights 
would have be devolved at an earlier date. This factor, whilst contradicting the belief of the 
Allies prior to ‘Market Garden’ of the weakness of the Germans, explains the renewed 
determination of the enemy in their defence of the Fatherland. 
The information gathered from this telegraph also corresponds with the second-hand 
testimony of Lionel Roebuck and his suggestion of Wehrmacht officers demanding that their 
position was held, and then leaving the soldiers to fend off the British.231 Thus, further 
revealing the fact that for the individual German soldier and officer, the struggle to defend 
the ground gained by the Nazis in 1940 was now one of utter desperation, leading to a will 
to fight for one’s life and country.  
Consequently, it must be acknowledged that the “ferocity” of battle was now also 
determined by the fact that it was being fought on the border of the Reich.232 This in turn 
led to a harder battle for the liberating forces as proved by the oral testimony of British 
troops. Peter Brown of 2nd Battalion East Yorkshire Regiment, makes this evident when 
referring to the fighting at Overloon in a typically subtle manner as, “a bit rough”.233 He also 
emphasises the fact that there was a lot of fierce street fighting in both Overloon and 
Venraij, which in turn further illuminates the ferocity of the fighting in the battles.234 
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The testimony of Officer Christopher Schofield of 4th Battalion Coldstream Guards, 6th 
Guards Tank Brigade, highlights the aforementioned fierceness encountered by the 21st 
Army Group at the battle of Overloon. When Schofield was asked by the interviewer of the 
opposition put up by the Germans, he responded, “they put up strong opposition there, and 
strong opposition just south at a place called Venraij… and that again was tough battle”.235 
He describes it as a “fairly nasty battle”, in which he and his battalion encountered “Riegel” 
anti-tank mines for the first time. He states that they were so powerful they could easily 
blow off the under plate of a Churchill tank, leading to the fact that “quite a lot of people 
were either killed or wounded by these mines”.236  
The use of mines is also referred to by Reginald Rutherford as causing many casualties when 
trying to cross the Lobeek.237 The use of mines is also claimed by Edward Jones to be 
because of the fact the Germans were on the defensive, and that in fact they were, “using 
mines much more extensively than they had before, particularly anti – personnel mines”.238 
To make this point more salient, Jones recites a time in which he was moving through an 
area “when the second in command said, very quietly, ‘just a moment, just stand still 
everyone’, and we did and he said ‘look down’, we all looked down. All of us were standing 
astride of these little needles, wires that stick up from these anti – personnel mines, the 
whole area was covered, so we very cautiously crept back”.239 Jones then goes on to tell of 
how, in the same mine field, a British soldier lost a foot, and upon being rescued, the man 
rescuing him lost a foot, to which Jones continued “it was a particularly nasty 
experience”.240  
From the testimony of these men, it is apparent that factors such as the greater intensity in 
the use of mines by the Germans - in order to support their defence of the region - was an 
eroding factor upon the morale of the British troops. Fundamentally, this is due to the 
casualties caused by these weapons. However, what must be seen as important is the 
design intention of a mine. Jones gives a description of the damage that could be inflicted by 
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a mine, noting that it can blow “pebbles and dirt and bits of shrapnel into your lower body 
as well, it was a very nasty weapon”.241  
Weapons with the intent to mutilate soldiers in such a way, have a psychological effect 
amongst troops. For instance, the use of the Churchill ‘Crocodile’, an adaptation from the 
Churchill tank which placed a flamethrower as its main armament, had such a damning 
effect upon German morale that crew members of the ‘Crocodile’ would very often be 
executed upon capture by the enemy.242 Therefore, when discussing morale, an important 
element of the effectiveness of these weapons is the fear that would be inflicted across the 
advancing British lines.    
The strength of the German resistance is clarified in Rutherford’s account, in which he 
describes his company’s approach to Overloon, he claims, “we reached the outskirts of 
Overloon and we were met with tremendous resistance. However, we persevered, lost a lot 
of men, lost two or three Company Commanders”.243 Rutherford’s account proves the hard 
fighting that was endured by his company in the liberation of Overloon. He makes evident 
also, the fact that the battle took a lot of British casualties in order to achieve their 
objective.  
Accounts such as these, makes clear the resurgence and strength of the Wehrmacht. 
Though, what is lacking from his account are reasons for why the Germans had been able to 
mount such a relatively solid defence. Consequently, evidence from SHAEF reports and 
decrypted messages from ULTRA, prove indispensable in discovering factors for the 
continued fight. They provide a structural perspective on to what instruments of 
‘encouragement’ were used by German commanders, as seen by the ULTRA messages, 
whilst also allowing the historian to gauge the opinion of SHAEF on a macro level. 
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Conclusion 
 
This work has sought to illuminate and identify key contributing factors to the decrease in 
morale of the British 21st Army Group following the failure of operation Market Garden on 
the 25th September 1944. This work has made this clear by the adoption of framework and 
research produced by Jonathan Fennell as a basis to provide a qualitative element to the 
study of this topic. The study of personal testimony of combatants alongside official reports, 
has enabled this thesis to discover and examine exogenous and endogenous factors 
influencing morale during the period of fighting.  
By using the framework set by Fennell (Sources 0.04 and 0.05), it is apparent that the factors 
most clearly impacting morale, can be identified as the weather conditions and terrain at 
the battle of Overloon and the subsequent battle for Venraij. The poor weather, not only 
produced a miserable, wet and cold environment for the men, but it also made the terrain 
much more problematic to manoeuvre. This of course, must be considered alongside the 
fact that the region was already low lying and prone to flooding – making it particularly hard 
for the movement of troops and heavy vehicles such as tanks. Thus, the result of this, was a 
battle fought heavily between infantry units leading to an increased number of casualties 
and consequently, a further decline in morale.  
Related to this, the Wehrmacht, who were now mounting a desperate defence of the 
Fatherland from the encroachment of the Allied war machine, were given an advantage. The 
difficulty faced by the British due to terrain and weather, enabled greater defensive success 
for the already dug in German forces. Which at any standard, given the fact many officers 
were leaving their units to fight to the death, and instructions were being ordered for the 
execution of undisciplined troops, cannot be argued as being an organised defence. 
Consequently, the terrain provided an advantage to the doomed defence of the Reich, by 
prolonging the fighting and making every advance costlier for the Allied forces. 
The resurgence of the Wehrmacht therefore, is an instrumental factor in the erosion of 
British morale, evident from the failure at ‘Market Garden’. The assumption of SHAEF that 
following instances such as the battle of the Falaise Pocket, and the retreat of the German 
forces from Normandy, was a view that would prove costly in both morale and in terms of 
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casualties. Clear from the repelling of the Allies at Arnhem, the German forces were no 
longer in retreat and were not in a position to be easily overcome. This strategic mistake by 
the Allies, led to the battles for Overloon and Venraij in the subsequent months.  
Now that the Germans had found their defensive positions and were putting a relatively 
solid, and ferocious defence, given the circumstance present to them, the difficulty endured 
by the British troops only escalated. This is because problems with terrain and weather were 
combined with techniques such as the greater use of explosive mines. Therefore, this 
resurgence is another factor which led to the further casualties and a greater destruction of 
morale amongst the troops of the 21st Army Group.   
In terms of recommendations for further study of the topic, further research and recording 
of interviews of those present at the battles, would be imperative in gaining an even greater 
understanding of issues influencing the morale of these men. Given, the limitations placed 
upon this study in terms of time, it would be useful for future study to visit the location in 
order to get a better awareness of the difficulty presented by the troops in regards to 
terrain. 
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